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We consider a pie-splitting game involving three committee members.  In response to 
the large literature on sequential procedures in this type of game, we propose an 
institution that is inspired by auction theory.  The (sealed) bids of the players are 
proposals for a distribution of the pie and are given simultaneously.  If any of the bids 
is preferred to all others in a pairwise comparison (i.e. a Condorcet winner exists) then 
this proposal is implemented.  If such a bid does not exist then an equal split of the pie 
is assumed.  An equilibrium of this game is for each player to suggest that one of the 
opponents should receive the lion’s share of the pie, even though each player cares 
only about his own share.  We call this phenomenon “rational benevolence”. 
Although the end that is desired by the players is purely egoistic, the means of 
achieving it may be perceived as benevolent.  Several applications of the game are 
suggested. 
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There is no escape from the fact that agreements reached by committees and 
legislatures pervade our economic life; it should then not be surprising that 
economists and political scientists have, for many years, attempted to uncover a 
theory of how such decisions are made. Several strands of literature intertwine in this 
vast field, combining the mechanisms of collective choice with the institutions – such 
as majority voting - from new political economy.1  The path toward a theory of 
committee decision-making has been littered with disappointment. Arrow’s (1951) 
infamous Impossibility Theorem showed at an early stage that a democratic collective 
choice mechanism will generally not be efficient.  May’s (1952) formalisation of 
majority voting – an often inherent feature of committee decision making – could not 
provide a way past Arrow’s theorem, as it is now well known that this institution is 
prone to voting cycles, or can otherwise be manipulated.2   
 
The set of rules governing the manner in which a committee or legislature reaches its 
decision is obviously of crucial importance for predicting the outcome. Again, the 
process of finding a set of rules that will lead to a decisive, efficient outcome has been 
problematic.  To narrow the focus, let us concentrate on a simple pie-splitting (or 
divide-the-dollar) example in a committee or legislature that obeys the principle of 
pure majority rule, i.e. each member has one vote, and votes sincerely for the proposal 
yielding most personal utility.  There are basically two ways in which proposals for 
the division of the pie can be pitched against each other.  With an open agenda, 
proposals are voted on in pairs in a sequential fashion, where the winning proposal 
from a round of voting faces a subsequent one.  Such a process often leads to cycling, 
and this does little to limit the range of possible outcomes at which the committee 
may arrive.  Indeed, a famous result by McKelvey (1976) demonstrates that, under 
certain conditions3 a sequence of pairwise votes can lead to any outcome in the Pareto 
set – for the pie-splitting example this means that all divisions may be reached.  The 
solution to this problem often involves invoking some form of closed agenda that 
specifies an endpoint for the process of proposal and counterproposal.  However, the 
                                                 
1 Inman (1987) gives a survey of some of the early literature here. 
2 On the former, the classic reference is Condorcet (1785), and on the latter, see Gibbard (1973) and 
Satterthwaite (1975). 
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committee members may then find it profitable to attempt to manipulate the agenda in 
order to gain an advantage, further affecting the efficiency of the decision mechanism.  
Generally, Shepsle (1979) has suggested specifying the institution that governs the 
decisions of a group of representatives, and analysing how varying the institution 
affects the equilibrium outcome. 
 
Myerson (1995) suggests that it may be fruitful to combine the insights from 
economic theory in analysing the functioning of political institutions (such as 
legislatures or committees).  In this paper, we suggest a set of rules by which a 
committee (or similar group of representatives) may reach decisions, that is inspired 
by the economic analysis of auctions. It is well known that an open auction – for 
example an English auction - is often used in situations where the bidding can be 
expected to reveal information that is relevant for the actions of the participants.  On 
the other hand, if there is a possibility that participants may attempt to strategically 
manipulate their actions then a closed (sealed bid) auction can be advantageous.4 
There is an obvious analogy here to the open/closed agenda discussion above. 
 
Klemperer (2003) highlights three core concerns in auction design: attracting entry, 
avoiding collusion and robustness to political pressure.  Bearing this in mind he goes 
a long way to advocating the use of sealed-bid auctions.5  In our model entry is not an 
issue as the number of committee members is fixed, but collusion and political 
pressure are often problems in the functioning of especially small committees. 
 
The institution that we specify is based upon a sealed bid auction in the following 
way.  A three-member committee (or legislature) has to divide a pie of fixed size 
among its members; each member is purely self-interested and wishes to secure as 
much of the pie as possible for himself.  Each member simultaneously proposes a 
distribution of the pie in the form of a sealed bid. 6  The bids are then made known 
and if a Condorcet winner exists then this distribution is implemented.  If no such 
proposal exists, then some pre-specified status quo distribution is effected.  In analogy 
                                                                                                                                            
3 Specifically, with preferences from the Euclidian metric. 
4 For a comprehensive survey of modern auction literature, see Klemperer (1999).  
5 Although he also stresses that in auction design “one size does not fit all”. 
6 Lockwood (2002) also allows representatives to make proposals simultaneously, but these proposals 
are then randomly put into an order specifying the sequence in which they appear in the agenda.  
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to the auction literature, we specify a fixed and credible rule for choosing among the 
bids. 
 
The equilibrium that we derive from this game exhibits a type of manipulative 
behaviour that at first glance may appear somewhat surprising.  In equilibrium it is 
rational for each member to offer one of the other members the lion’s share of the pie, 
a phenomenon that we have chosen to call “rational benevolence”.7  The result is 
presented in the next section, and is discussed in Section 3. 
 
2. Rational benevolence 
 
The basic structure of the model is as follows. Three risk-neutral committee members, 
denoted by the set M = {A, B, C} must divide a pie of size 1 among themselves by 
mutual consent.  The payoff to a player is simply the share of the pie that he receives.  
The game is played once.  Each player j ∈ M submits a written proposal (sealed bid) 
simultaneously, specifying how the pie should be divided.  Denote the proposal from 
player j ∈ M by (xAj, xBj, xCj), where xAj + xBj + xCj = 1 (i.e. the whole pie is 
distributed).  We introduce a further technical restriction on the proposals, namely that 
2/3 ≥ xij for all i, j ∈ M.  This restriction is needed to tie down the equilibrium and 
will be further commented upon below.  We can view this as similar to the reserve 
price in an auction that limits the lowest/highest amount that can be suggested by the 
players. 
 
Importantly, a proposal cannot be amended once it has been submitted.  The bids are 
then opened, and the Condorcet winner is implemented if it exists.  We rule out 
indifference in the pairwise comparison by assuming that bids are delivered with a 
small element of noise so that the probability of assigning the same share to any 
player is zero.8  If no Condorcet winner exists then a pre-specified division of the pie 
is used in which each player receives an equal share. 
 
                                                 
7 Sidgewick (1877) introduced the Principle of Rational Benevolence into the philosophical literature. 
This notion is quite distinct from our concept and is further discussed in Section 3. 
8 As the noise component approaches zero one would need to specify a rule to break ties. 
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Consider Figure 1 that depicts an equilateral triangle with altitudes equal to 1, 
representing the size of the pie. Side i = A, B, C of the triangle represents a “baseline” 
for player i from which this player’s share is measured.  A division of the pie can then 
be depicted by a point in the triangle; the further away this point is from player i’s 
baseline, the larger share that will be allocated to that player.  The division (1/3, 1/3, 
1/3) is at the intersection of the three altitudes of the triangle. 
 
In Figure 1, imagine that point Z is the bid by one of the players; in a pairwise 
comparison, this point will beat proposals that are in the shaded areas, but will lose to 
divisions in the white areas.  Compare Z with Y for example: Z gives more to player B 
and C than Y, but less to A.  In a pairwise comparison, Z is preferred to Y. 
 
To avoid technical details of minor interest, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium of 
the model. The unique symmetric equilibrium of the game is given in the following 




The following mixed strategies constitute the unique symmetric equilibrium of the 
game: a) player A suggests division (1/3, 2/3, 0) with probability 0.5, and division 
(1/3, 0, 2/3) with probability 0.5; b) player B suggests division (2/3, 1/3, 0) with 
probability 0.5, and division (0, 1/3, 2/3) with probability 0.5; c) player C suggests 
division (2/3, 0, 1/3) with probability 0.5, and division (0, 2/3, 1/3) with probability 
0.5.  
 





 3. Discussion 
 
The behaviour that we see as a feature of the Proposition is what we call “rational 
benevolence”, and has not featured in the relevant literature before as far as we are 
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aware.  A rational strategy to follow in this game is to offer the lion’s share of the 
spoils to another actor, whilst the third player is given nothing.  This equilibrium 
strategy is similar to buying an option with a full upside, and no downside.  To 
explain the logic here, let us concentrate on the actions of player A, supposing that he 
proposes that A be given 1/3, and B 2/3.  This is illustrated in Figure 2, where it is 
clear that this defeats all proposals giving A less than 1/3.  By making this offer to B, 
A secures his support for this proposal, and this guarantees A no less than 1/3 (no 
downside); at the same time, threatening C with nothing means that C has an 
incentive to offer A more than 1/3, as this ensures A’s vote (full upside). 
 
Whilst it looks as if the proposals made in equilibrium reflect a caring for the other 
committee members, they are the outcome of a perfectly rational and egotistical 
strategy in this game. Quite apart from this is the principle of Rational Benevolence 
introduced into the philosophy literature by Sidgewick (1877; 31): “…the principle of 
Rational Benevolence, that sets before each man the good of all others as an object of 
pursuit no less worthy than his own”. This of course parallels the original definition of 
altruism attributed to Comte (1851-54;400): “The chief problem of human life [is] the 
subordination of egoism to altruism”. According to Korsgaard et. al (1996) one of the 
challenges of altruism is to show that “the points of view from which these different 
interests arise are congruent, that meeting the claims made from one point of view 
will not necessarily mean violating those that arise from another” (Korsgaard et al, 
1996; 60-61). The problem of altruism has recently been addressed by Graham (2002) 
who focuses on preferences with regards to the ends that can be achieved. The 
altruistic component of the behaviour that we have identified focuses rather on the 
means by which these can be achieved. In our notion of rational benevolence, agents 
are inherently self-interested, but their observed behaviour is reminiscent of actions 
that would usually be assumed to originate from an altruistic set of preferences. This 
may also be regarded as a counterexample to Sen (1994) who argues that making 
agents’ payoffs a function of their own outcome “has some difficulty in 
accommodating “social” behaviour such as ….. not grabbing the uniquely largest slice 
of cake” (Sen, 1994;385). 
 
Our model has been inspired by auction theory so it is natural to look for a parallel 
result to ours in this literature. Our equilibrium outcome resembles that of McAfee 
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and McMillan (1992) that a weak bidding ring (without cash payments between 
members) cannot do better than to randomize the right to bid between members and 
let one of them win at the reserve price.  In the committee model the identity of the 
winner (i.e. the player that gets 2/3) is random, but the amount achieved is always at 
the “reserve price”. Within political economics, one may view equilibrium behaviour 
in this game as implicit logrolling in which proposals are “packaged” in order to make 
them palatable to the majority of the voters.9  Here the packaging involves an 
apparent benevolence to other members, not unlike the phenomenon of “bureaucratic 
deception” discussed by Tullock et al. (2000; 63). 
 
We should emphasise again the fact that our results rest upon the assumption that no 
member can propose a share of more then 2/3 of the pie to himself or any other 
member.  This restriction seems necessary to guarantee the existence of equilibrium.  
Consider what would happen if this restriction were relaxed, so that it is possible to 
allocate at most 2/3+ε to one player.  Suppose that B and C retain the equilibrium 
strategy from Proposition 1; then A’s best response would be to randomize between 
the other players, giving one 2/3+ε, and reducing his own share correspondingly.  
This strategy eliminates one of the outcomes in which player A gets zero with positive 
probability in the original equilibrium, and is hence better than the original 
equilibrium strategy.  This cannot be an equilibrium situation, however, since the best 
response of B and C would be to reduce their shares in a similar manner.  As the 
amount that can maximally be given to a single player is raised further, the best 
response is to keep reducing one’s own share.  As the bids approach the corner points 
in the triangle, however, a player can increase his share by proposing 1/3+ ε to 
himself and 1/3- ε/2 to each opponent.  The best reply to this would then be to give 
oneself 2/3 and one of the other players 1/3.  But then the best response to this would 
be for the other players to reduce their own shares again and give most of the pies to 
one of the other players.  So we have a cyclical situation (to which we – as yet - have 
found no end).  
 
Finally, we note that the model permits several interpretations and applications.  The 
pie to be divided can be thought of as an income or a cost; in the model presented 
                                                 
9 Tullock et al. (2000; 33) document that this strategy was used by President Eisenhower during his 
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above, the pie represents income to the participants, but one could easily redefine the 
model so that the committee members are assigning cost shares among themselves.  
The three members could be states that must agree on tax shares to be paid to a 
federal government.  Or the members could be partners in a Research Joint Venture 
that must divide project costs.  Alternatively they could represent the Triple Helix of 
industry-government-university relations bargaining over cost shares in a joint 
project.10  In these “cost shares” applications, a rational strategy in the symmetric 
equilibrium would be for each actor to offer to pay the most (realising that in 
equilibrium this ensures an expected share of one third). 
                                                                                                                                            
period of office. 
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Here we prove the Proposition. 
We first show that the proposed equilibrium is a best reply, and then prove 




Consider Figure A1. We first show that there exists no a ≠ a1 ,a2 which gives expected 
payoff larger than 1/3. Observe first that any proposal a in the interior of I, including 
segment b1-c1 strictly dominates c2, b2. Hence with zero probability A obtains strictly 
above 1/3 and with strictly positive probability strictly below 1/3. Secondly, any 
proposal in II, including the line segment c2-b2 is strictly dominated by b1, c1. Hence 
A obtains 0 in all cases, except in the event c2, b2 (which occurs with probability ¼) at 
which he obtains at most 2/3. Third, any proposal in III is dominated by both c1 and c2 
and the proposal dominates both b1 and b2. Hence A obtains either 1/3 or C’s 
proposal. However, conditioned on Cs proposal winning, the probability that A 
obtains 0 (that is if C proposes c1) exceeds the probability of obtaining 2/3 (if C 
proposes c2) since b1 strictly dominates c2.  Fourth, any proposal on the borderline 
between I and III (or II and III) provides A with a weighted average of what he 
obtains by bidding strictly inside I and strictly inside III (as with areas II and III). 











with positive probability (without reducing the probability of 2/3), hence A’s payoff 
increases as he moves towards a1. Along a1-b2 observe that a proposal a strictly above 
a1 cannot win, whereas a bid a1 wins with positive probability (in situations where c1 
alternatively would have won).  
 






Assume B with certainty submits bids in area VI and A (by symmetry) with certainty 
in area II. Due to symmetry, min bC = min bA where min bJ denotes the smallest share 
that J = A, C offers B. If min bJ is not a masspoint, that proposal loses with certainty, 
hence J obtains at most 1/3 and obtains less than 1/3 with strictly positive probability. 
If min bJ is a mass point, J increases the probability of obtaining strictly more than 1/3 















Next min bJ = 1/3 (which is the pure strategy of splitting the pie evenly) is obviously 
not a symmetric equilibrium (it would be a best reply to redistribute in own favour, 
offering one of the opponents slightly more than 1/3). 
 
 Hence in equilibrium, each player proposes to give at least one opponent strictly 
more than 1/3, that is: with positive probability B submits bids in the areas I, II and/or 
III  (as in IV and/or V due to symmetry). Consider any combination of bids from B 
and C that deviate from the equilibrium strategy. Then it follows that by bidding a1, 
A’s expected payoff strictly exceeds 1/3. To see this, observe that any deviating bid 
that provides A with strictly less than 1/3 is strictly dominated by a1 – hence cannot 
win. Whereas the “twin-bid“ (due to symmetry) which provides A with strictly more 
than 1/3 wins with strictly positive probability. Hence any deviation yields A with a 
strictly positive upside and no downside. Since the game is zero-sum this contradicts 
an equilibrium.  
 
 
